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11 Introduction
Uncertainty and information are crucial in virtually all economic decisions. They
are a major source of the complexity that characterizes modern economies, and, in
turn, of most criticisms of neoclassical economics and general equilibrium theory.
Naturally, a large body of literature still under development seeks to incorporate
uncertainty and asymmetric information in the model of Arrow and Debreu.
The theory of general equilibrium under uncertainty has developed upon the
formulation of objects of choice as contingent consumption claims (Arrow, 1953).
Under this formulation, besides being deﬁned by their physical properties and
their location in space and time, commodities can also be deﬁned by their location
in “state”. For example, an “umbrella” in “rainy weather” and an “umbrella” in
“sunny weather” are seen as two diﬀerent commodities.
In the markets for contingent delivery, agents trade their state-dependent
endowments for state-dependent consumption bundles. Radner (1968) extended
the model of Arrow and Debreu to a setting of asymmetric information, by re-
stricting agents to buy rights for delivery that can only be contingent upon events
that they observe. As a consequence, each agent consumes the same in states of
nature that she does not distinguish. That is, consumption is measurable with
respect to the private information of the agents.
This restriction of measurability implies incentive compatibility. Whatever the
state of nature that occurs, agents are always sure about the bundle that will be
delivered to them, so they cannot be deceived. But incentive compatibility does
not imply measurability, so this restriction may be seen as too severe.
In the modern economy, there are many situations in which the condition of
measurability does not hold. Consider the contracts known as “options”. The
2decision of the buyer to exercise or not the option may be based on the observation
of an event that the seller cannot observe. So, the seller may end up with diﬀerent
bundles in states of nature that she would not be able to distinguish with her
private information.
Having to consume the same in states of nature that the agent does not distinguish
a priori seems a strong restriction. Relaxing this restriction could allow the
achievement of better outcomes, in the sense of Pareto. But does it make sense
for an agent to buy the right to receive diﬀerent bundles in states of nature that
she will not distinguish?
In undistinguished states of nature, the agent should have the same rights and
obligations. This is a sensible idea and avoids problems of incentive compatibility.
But to have the same rights and obligations does not imply consuming the same
bundle. For example, an agent may buy the right to receive a “ham sandwich
or cheese sandwich”. The actual consumption is uncertain. Nevertheless, the
agent values the right to consume this uncertain bundle since both possibilities
are desirable.
We designate these multiple alternative bundles as “lists”. And what we propose
is that agents choose between contingent lists, instead of contingent bundles. If
the contingency occurs, a contingent list gives an agent the right to receive one of
the bundles in the list. Since the agent has no control over the selection of a bundle
from the list for delivery, a list may be seen as an uncertain bundle and objects of
choice as uncertain consumption bundles. This goes further than Arrow’s (1953)
formulation of objects of choice as contingent consumption bundles.
Underlying this formulation is the possibility of agents to sign “contracts for
uncertain delivery”. These contracts specify a list of bundles out of which a single
one will be selected for delivery if the contingency occurs. Agents buy the right
to receive one of the bundles in the list. For example, instead of buying the right
3to receive an “umbrella” if “weather is rainy” or the right to receive a “raincoat”
if “weather is rainy”, agents may also buy the right to receive an “umbrella or
raincoat” if “weather is rainy”. Observe that contracts for contingent delivery
are also “contracts for uncertain delivery” with lists of a single element.
As agents are able to sign more general contracts, allowing contracts for uncertain
delivery may be seen as opening additional markets. A supplier may not be able
to guarantee the delivery of neither a “ham sandwich” nor a “cheese sandwich”,
while being able to ensure the delivery of one of the two. In the Arrow-Radner
framework this would lead to a “no trade” situation, while contracts for uncertain
delivery allow trade to take place. This is what occurs in the example of the
“generalized commodities” (section 3).
The problem is to assign prices and utilities to uncertain bundles. Consider
a contract for the delivery of “ham sandwich or cheese sandwich”. The right to
receive a “ham sandwich or cheese sandwich” is weaker than the right to receive a
“ham sandwich”. Observe that the ﬁrst does not imply the second, while delivery
of a “ham sandwich” implies delivery of a “ham sandwich or cheese sandwich”.
Thus, uncertain delivery of “ham sandwich or cheese sandwich” should not be
more expensive nor give more utility than the delivery of a “ham sandwich”.
If it were more expensive, there would be an opportunity for arbitrage. An
intermediary could buy a “ham sandwich” and sell it as a “ham sandwich or
cheese sandwich” with proﬁt. If it gave more utility, a simple “ham sandwich”
would not be sold. All sellers would prefer to sell a “ham sandwich or cheese
sandwich” and always deliver a “ham sandwich”.
For analytical convenience, in our model agents do not buy lists (uncertain
bundles). They buy contingent bundles, as in the model of Radner, but these do
not need to be measurable with respect to the information of the agent. What
we do is an extension of the domain in which preferences are deﬁned to include
also the bundles that are not measurable. We argue that nothing essential is lost
4relatively to a model where agents buy lists (see section 6). For an agent, a list
is equivalent to a bundle that is not measurable with respect to her information.
This equivalence is illustrated in the example that follows.
Consider three possible states of nature: Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3}. An agent does not
distinguish ω1 from ω2, but may select a random consumption bundle that delivers
x1 in ω1, x2 in ω2 and x3 in ω3. With x1 6= x2, this consumption bundle is not
measurable with respect to her information. In ω1 and ω2, the agent will have
to accept delivery of x1 or x2. She may prefer x1 and the real state of nature
may be ω1, but since she cannot prove that the state of nature is ω1, she has
to accept x2 if it is the bundle that is delivered. In ω1 and ω2, she receives an
uncertain bundle that we denote as (x1∨x2). Instead of writing the consumption
bundle as x = (x1,x2,x3), from the perspective of the agent it would be more
adequate to use the notation ¯ x = [(x1 ∨ x2),(x1 ∨ x2),x3]. Observe that this
construction implies measurability of the vector of contingent lists with respect
to the information of the agent.
In this setting, assigning prices to the lists becomes straightforward. The in-
formation of the agent is P = {{ω1,ω2},{ω3}}. She can obtain the list ¯ x =
[(x1 ∨x2),(x1 ∨x2),x3] by buying any of the following bundles: xa = (x1,x1,x3),
xb = (x1,x2,x3), xc = (x2,x1,x3), or xd = (x2,x2,x3). It only makes sense to
buy the cheapest of these bundles, so the price of a list is actually the price of
the cheapest bundle that is equivalent, for the agent, to the list.
Another issue concerns the preferences of an agent regarding a set of bundles out
of which she will obtain her consumption bundle. What is the utility of (x1∨x2)?
Our proposal is that the utility of an uncertain bundle (a list) is equal to the
utility of the worst possible outcome.
The following three assumptions suﬃce to arrive at these “pessimistic
preferences”: (1) agents are neutral with respect to uncertainty, that is, they
5are indiﬀerent between a bundle and a list in which all the alternatives have the
same utility as that bundle; (2) the substitution of a bundle in a list for another
with greater utility does not decrease the utility of the list; and (3) agents are
indiﬀerent between a bundle x1 and a list with x1 and xT, where xT is greater
than the total resources in the economy.4
If consumption is measurable with respect to the information of the agents, the
lists that correspond to the events that the agent observes (sets of the partition of
information) have only one element. To see this, let the information of an agent
be P = {{ω1,ω2},{ω3}}, and consider the measurable consumption bundle x =
(x1,x1,x3). The correspondent list is ¯ x = [(x1 ∨ x1),(x1 ∨ x1),x3] = (x1,x1,x3).
With lists having only one element, the pessimistic expected utility of
consumption bundles that are measurable is equal to the classical expected utility.
What is done is an enlargement of the domain in which utility is deﬁned to in-
clude also the non-measurable bundles, but the values in the space of measurable
bundles are preserved.
Assuming that the seller knows the preferences of the buyer, we should expect
the bundles in the list to have equal utility for the buyer. Suppose that an agent
buys the uncertain bundle (x1∨x2) and u(x2) > u(x1). The utility of this bundle
is equal to the utility of the worst alternative: u(x1 ∨ x2) = u(x1). So, the seller
could substitute x2 by a fraction x0
2 = (1 − δ)x2 such that u(x0
2) = u(x1). The
utility of this bundle, (x1 ∨x0
2) would still be equal to u(x1), and the seller would
retain a valuable bundle, δx2. In sum, it does not make sense for the seller to
oﬀer alternatives with diﬀerent utility, because the buyer focuses only on the
worst alternative.
The assumption that the market knows the preferences of the agents is common
in general equilibrium, as the Walrasian auctioneer uses the preferences of the
4They will always receive x1, and never xT, so the indiﬀerence between x1 and (x1 ∨ xT) is
actually realistic.
6agents to arrive at the equilibrium prices. In fact, we arrive naturally at these
equal utility alternatives in equilibrium. In our model, a property of competitive
equilibrium is that the consumption bundles have measurable utility. That is, the
lists selected by the agents for each event that they observe have bundles with
equal utility.
While the intuition for the concept of rational expectations equilibrium was the
idea that “agents cannot be fooled”, our equilibrium concept can be justiﬁed with
an opposite idea: “the market cannot be fooled”. It has also some relation to
Murphy’s law: “if anything can go wrong, it will”.
With alternatives having the same utility, after observing the state of nature, the
buyer is sure about the utility that she is entitled to receive. There is uncertainty
about the consumption bundle, but not about the utility that is obtained. Agents
cannot be deceived to receive consumption bundles with lower utility. So, under
the hypothesis of neutrality towards uncertainty, agents do not care about having
been deceived or not.
For example, consider two agents and two states of nature where the diﬀerence
between ω1 and ω2 is the result of a toss of a coin by agent B, an event that agent
A cannot observe. Agent A may accept to pay “$1” to receive a “ham sandwich”
from agent B if the result is heads, and a “cheese sandwich” if it is tails. Being
indiﬀerent between the two sandwiches, the impossibility of distinguishing the
two states a priori is not a problem. Agent A does not fear being “tricked”, as
receiving a sandwich is guaranteed.
Since agents cannot be deceived, problems of incentive compatibility do not arise,
independently of the beliefs of the buyer relatively to the preferences of the seller.
In sum, the consideration of this type of contracts allows us to relax in a natural
way the measurability assumption, while preserving incentive compatibility. This
enlarges the space of allocations, improving the eﬃciency of exchange, relatively
7to the Walrasian expectations equilibrium (Radner) solutions.
The inclusion of these contracts for uncertain delivery in the general equilibrium
theory is based on the pessimistic preferences just described. With these
preferences, we incorporate uncertainty and asymmetric information in the model
of Arrow-Debreu in a direction that seems more satisfactory than the proposal
of Radner. This is accomplished by an extension of the utility functions from
the domain of measurable consumption bundles to the whole space. The essen-
tial properties of the primitive utility functions are preserved. As a consequence,
all the results in the literature still hold: existence of competitive equilibrium,
existence of core, core convergence, continuity properties, welfare theorems, etc.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 contracts for uncertain delivery are
introduced; sections 3 and 4 consist of the examples that motivate the paper; in
section 5 we derive the preferences over uncertain bundles; in section 6 the model
of general equilibrium with asymmetric information is presented; and, ﬁnally, in
section 7 we conclude the paper with several results.
82 Contracts for Uncertain Delivery
A “contract for contingent delivery” (Arrow, 1953) speciﬁes a bundle to be de-
livered if a certain event occurs. We extend this notion to allow for the delivery
of an uncertain bundle. Instead of a single bundle, a list of possible bundles is
speciﬁed. “Contracts for uncertain delivery” stipulate that the seller must deliver
to the buyer one of the bundles in a list.
The buyer is certain about receiving one of the bundles in the list, but has no
control over the selection process. She does not know the probabilities of receiving
each of the bundles (if the probabilities were known, a better designation would
be of a “contract for risky delivery”). We designate as “seller” the agent that
selects the bundle to be delivered, and as “buyer” the agent that obtains the
right to receive one of the bundles in a list.
A generalized contract for contingent delivery speciﬁes: the price of the con-
tract, a list of possible bundles to be delivered, and the states of nature in which
delivery takes place. Contracts commonly known as “options” are included in
this deﬁnition.
These contracts allow an increase in the eﬃciency of trade, relatively to the
regular contingent contracts. In the next two sections, we present diﬀerent situa-
tions in which trade is not possible with contingent contracts. As a consequence,
Walrasian expectations equilibrium is a “no trade” situation. But contracts for
uncertain delivery allow trade to take place, allowing welfare improvements in
the sense of Pareto.
93 Example: Generalized Commodities
In the example that follows, contracts for uncertain delivery allow agents to reach
the full information outcome, while if they were restricted to contingent contracts,
“no trade” would be an equilibrium.
This economy has two agents and four commodities: “ham sandwiches”, “cheese
sandwiches”, “orange juices” and “apple juices”.
There are four states of nature, Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4}.
- In ω1, agent A is endowed with two “ham sandwiches” and agent B with
two “orange juices”: eA(ω1) = (2,0,0,0) and eB(ω1) = (0,0,2,0);
- In ω2, agent A is endowed with two “ham sandwiches” and agent B with
two “apple juices”: eA(ω2) = (2,0,0,0) and eB(ω2) = (0,0,0,2);
- In ω3, agent A is endowed with two “cheese sandwiches” and agent B with
two “orange juices”: eA(ω3) = (0,2,0,0) and eB(ω3) = (0,0,2,0);
- In ω4, agent A is endowed with two “cheese sandwiches” and agent B with
two “apple juices”: eA(ω4) = (0,2,0,0) and eB(ω4) = (0,0,0,2).
Each agent observes only its endowments. Their information partitions are:
PA = {ω1,ω2},{ω3,ω4} and PB = {ω1,ω3},{ω2,ω4}.
Their preferences are the same in every state. The sandwiches are perfect sub-
stitutes, as well as the juices. But agents like to mix sandwiches and juices. A
Cobb-Douglas utility function describes their tastes:
U = (sh + sc)0.5 · (jo + ja)0.5.
10Observe that agent A is not be able to guarantee the delivery of neither a “ham
sandwich” nor a “cheese sandwich”. Agent B has the same problem with guar-
anteeing delivery of “orange juice” or “apple juice”. As a consequence, we have
“no trade”! To see this, suppose that agent A consumed some quantity of “or-
ange juice” in ω1. She would have to consume the same in ω2 (because she does
not distinguish ω1 and ω2), but in ω2 there isn’t any “orange juice”. This is a
contradiction.5
The “no trade” situation may be overcome if we consider that an agent can buy
a sandwich (or a juice). We model this with contracts for the delivery of one out
of two bundles. One of the agents sells a “ham sandwich or cheese sandwich”,
while the other sells an “orange juice or apple juice”. Since agent A is able to
ensure the delivery of a “sandwich” and agent B is able to ensure the delivery
of a “juice”, contracts for uncertain delivery allow them to attain the optimal
outcome. Agents trade a sandwich for a drink, thus, in every state of nature
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Both agents obtain an utility that is equal to 1 in all states of nature, so expected
pessimistic utility is equal to 1. This constitutes an improvement in the sense
of Pareto relatively to the Walrasian expectations equilibrium solution, which
resulted in an utility of zero to both agents.
Together with the price vector p = 1
24[(1,2,1,2);(1,2,2,1);(2,1,1,2);(2,1,2,1)],
this allocation is a competitive equilibrium of the economy with uncertain
5We can assume strictly positive endowments, substituting every zero for a small , and
reach the same conclusions.
11delivery.
Allocations in the core are of the form:
xA =

        
        
(a,0,2 − b,0) in ω1,
(a,0,0,2 − b) in ω1,
(0,a,2 − b,0) in ω1,
(0,a,0,2 − b) in ω4.
xB =

        
        
(2 − a,0,b,0) in ω1,
(2 − a,0,0,b) in ω1,
(0,2 − a,b,0) in ω1,
(0,2 − a,0,b) in ω4.
In states of nature that an agent does not distinguish “a priori” the consumption
vectors are diﬀerent, but note that the correspondent utility is always the same.
124 Example: Risk Sharing
Consider two agents with information ﬁelds that do not allow them to make
contingent contracts. The space of states of nature is {ω1,ω2,ω3}, and agents have
the information partitions: PA = {{ω1},{ω2,ω3}} and PB = {{ω1,ω2},{ω3}}.
Suppose that both agents have the following prior probabilities: 0.499 for ω1 and
ω3 and 0.002 for ω2.














The agents have equal preferences, constant across states of nature. Good 1 has
a diminishing marginal utility and good 2 (may be interpreted as money) has
constant marginal utility:
UA(x1,x2) = UB(x1,x2) = 10
√
x1 + x2.
Observe that the game is symmetric. Agent A wants to sell good 1 in ω1 and to
buy in {ω2,ω3}. Agent B wants good 1 in {ω1,ω2} and to sell it in ω3.
The total resources in the economy are:
etotal =

     




In the least probable state, ω2, physical feasibility implies that xA
1 +xB
1 = 2. This
restriction is crucial. Now let’s analyze ﬁrst the symmetric possibilities.
13(1 - with symmetry) If xA
1 (ω2) = xB
1 (ω2) = 1, measurability implies that xA
1 = 1
in ω3 and xB
1 = 1 in ω1. Agents retain their endowments, so there is no trade.
The resulting utilities are:
U1 = U2 = 0.499 · (10
√
199 + 100) + 0.501 · 110 = 0.499 · 241 + 0.501 · 110 = 175.





1 (ω2) = xA
1 (ω3) = 1 + e,
xB
1 (ω2) = xB
1 (ω1) = 1 − e.





1 (ω1) ≤ 200 − xB
1 (ω1) ≤ 199 + e,
xB
1 (ω3) ≤ 200 − xA
1 (ω3) ≤ 199 − e.
It may be seen that the only measurable and eﬃcient allocations are of the form:

     
     
xA(ω1) = (199 + e,100 − p),
xA(ω2) = (1 + e,100 − p),
xA(ω3) = (1 + e,100 − p).

     
     
xB(ω1) = (1 − e,100 + p),
xB(ω2) = (1 − e,100 + p),
xB(ω3) = (199 − e,100 + p).
Trade is constant across states of nature. To receive an additional quantity, e, of
good 1, agent A pays p units of good 2. Since the utility of good 2 is linear (agents
can transfer utility through good 2), this assumption can be made without loss
of generality. Then:
UA = 0.499 · (10 ·
√
199 + e + 100 − p) + 0.501 · (10 ·
√
1 + e + 100 − p) =
= 4.99 ·
√
199 + e + 5.01 ·
√
1 + e + 100 − p.
UB = 0.499 · (10 ·
√
199 − e) + 0.501 · (10 ·
√
1 − e) + 100 + p =
= 4.99 ·
√
199 − e + 5.01 ·
√
1 − e + 100 + p.
UA + UB = 4.99 · (
√
199 + e +
√
199 − e) + 5.01 · (
√
1 + e +
√
1 − e) + 200.
d(UA + UB)
de

















14It is not possible to increase the sum of the utilities, therefore Pareto improve-
ments are not possible. The asymmetric solution is even worst. We have “no
trade” in this economy. The only “core” allocation corresponds to the initial
endowments.
Can the agents improve this situation? In the symmetric allocations, each agent
gets (1,100) in ω2. The correspondent utilities are uA = uB = 110. An allocation




1 (ω3) + xA
2 (ω3) = 110 ⇒ xA




Thus, xA(ω3) must be of the form:
xA(ω3) = (X,110 − 10
√
X).
Without waste of resources, we have xB(ω3) = (200 − X,90 + 10
√
X). By sym-
metry, xB(ω1) = (X,110 − 10
√
X) and xA(ω1) = (200 − X,90 + 10
√
X).
The utility of agent A in {ω2,ω3} is given and equal to 110. To arrive at an
optimal solution, it is enough to maximize utility in ω1:
U = 10
√
200 − X + 90 + 10
√
X ⇒
⇒ U0 = −5 · (200 − X)−1/2 + 5 · X−1/2.
U0 = 0 ⇒ (200 − X)−1/2 = X−1/2 ⇒
⇒ X = 100.
uA(ω1) = 10 ·
√
100 + 90 + 10
√
100 = 290.
UA = UB = 0.499 · 290 + 0.501 · 110 = 200.
The symmetric optimal solution is:
xA =

     












     










They can obtain this allocation by signing a contract under which, in every state
of nature, each agent would deliver to the other one of two bundles: (99,−90)
or (0,0). It is straightforward to see that agents would deliver (99,−90) if their
endowments are (199,100), ending up with (100,190) in that state of nature.
This solution can also be achieved as a competitive equilibrium with the pre-
vailing price vector p = [(1,2); 2
499(10,2);(1,2)], leading agents to select the non-
measurable bundles xA and xB.
The resulting expected utility is close to 200, higher than the 175 which corre-
spond to the classical solution. Again, the possibility of signing these contracts
allows a Pareto improvement in the exchange economy.
165 Preferences over uncertain bundles
A crucial matter concerns the preferences of agents regarding uncertain bundles
(lists). What is the utility of (x1∨x2)? Equivalently, suppose that an agent signs
a contract that may give him diﬀerent consumption bundles in states of nature
that she does not distinguish. If these bundles have diﬀerent utilities, then what
utility should she assign to the contract?
Start by assuming that agents are neutral with respect to uncertainty, in the
sense made precise below:
Assumption 1 (Uncertainty neutrality)
∀x1,...,xk : u(x1) = ... = u(xk) ⇒ u(x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk) = u(x1) = ... = u(xk).
Assume also a kind of monotonicity.
Assumption 2 (Weak monotonicity)
u(xj) ≥ u(yj) , ∀j = 1,...,k ⇒ u(x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk) ≥ u(y1 ∨ ... ∨ yk).
These two assumptions imply that the utility of a list is greater than the utility of
the worst possibility. To see this, assume, w.l.o.g., that the least preferred bundle
in a list ¯ x = (x1∨...∨xk) is x1. Continuous preferences imply that if u(xj) > u(x1),
then there exists δj > 0 such that x0
j = (1 − δj)xj and u(x0
j) = u(x1). That is, if
the outcomes have diﬀerent utilities, then we can remove a positive fraction from
some of them to arrive at a modiﬁed list ¯ x0 in which all the alternatives have
the same utility as x1. By monotonicity (A.2), u(¯ x) ≥ u(¯ x0). By uncertainty
neutrality (A.1), the utility of the list ¯ x0 is equal to the utility of x1. As a
consequence, u(¯ x) ≥ u(x1). We arrive at Proposition 1, which states that the
utility of a list cannot be lower than the utility of the worst outcome.
17Proposition 1 (Rationality)
∀x1,...,xk : u(x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk) ≥ min
j=1,...,k
u(xj).
Observe that receiving x1 guarantees that the right to receive (x1∨x2) is satisﬁed.
This advises the agent not to assign a higher utility to the uncertain bundle.
Suppose that uncertainty is between three possible bundles: a “ham sandwich”,
a “cheese sandwich” and “$1 million”. Since it is the (hypothetic) seller that
selects the bundle after the observation of the state of nature, the buyer should
simply ignore the possibility of receiving “$1 million”.
We need only a weaker assumption: an agent is indiﬀerent between a bundle x1
and a list with x1 and xT, where xT is greater than the total resources in the
economy. The agent realistically expects to receive always x1, and never xT, so
she is indiﬀerent between x1 and (x1 ∨ xT).
Assumption 3 (Realism) Let xT >
P
e.
∀x1,...,xk : u(x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk ∨ xT) = u(x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk).
If introducing xT does not increase the utility of the list, then, by our monotonicity
assumption (A.2), we know that introducing an alternative that is less attractive
than xT also does not. So, the inclusion of additional alternative bundles (which
may never be selected) does not increase the utility of the list.
Proposition 2 (Irrelevance of better alternatives)
∀x1,...,xk,xk+1 : u(x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk ∨ xk+1) ≤ u(x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk).
Without loss of generality, suppose that x1 is the worst outcome in the list. From
A.2 and A.3, we have: u(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ... ∨ xk) ≤ u(x1 ∨ xT ∨ ... ∨ xT) = u(x1).
Rationality (P.1) implies that we arrive at “pessimistic preferences”. Agents are
indiﬀerent between the uncertain bundle and the worst possibility.
18Proposition 3 (Pessimistic preferences)
∀x1,...,xk : u(x1 ∨ ... ∨ xk) = min
j=1,...,k
u(xj).
In sum, “uncertainty neutrality” (A.1), “weak monotonicity” (A.2) and “realism”
(A.3) imply what we designate as “pessimistic preferences” (P.3).
Observe that the pessimistic expected utility of consumption bundles that are
measurable with respect to the information of the agents is equal to the classical
expected utility. What is done is an enlargement of the domain in which utility
is deﬁned to include also the non-measurable bundles, preserving the values in
the space of measurable bundles.
196 General Equilibrium with Uncertainty
Our model of an exchange economy with diﬀerential information assumes a ﬁnite
number of agents, commodities and states of nature. The economy extends over
two time periods. In the ﬁrst, agents trade their endowments for multiple alter-
native deliveries (lists) that may be contingent on the state of nature that occurs
in the second period (ex-ante contract arrangement). In the second period they
receive and consume one of the alternative bundles correspondent to the events
that they observe.
This suggests that each agent selects a list, contingent on events that she can
observe. Such object of choice can be denoted as ¯ x ∈ IRΩKl or ¯ x : Ω −→ IRKl,
assuming that lists have a maximum of K alternatives.6
In our model, agent don’t select lists. What they select are contingent bundles
which need not be measurable with respect to their information. These bundles
are, in turn, equivalent to lists. For example, suppose that Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3},
and that the agent’s partition of information is Pi = {{ω1,ω2},{ω3}}. The agent
may select a consumption bundle that is not Pi-measurable, x = (x1,x2,x3).
If the agent observes {ω1,ω2}, she has the right to receive x1 or x2, while
the observation of ω3 ensures consumption of x3. So, from the perspective of
the agent, this bundle is seen as the following Pi-measurable uncertain bundle:
x = [(x1 ∨ x2),(x1 ∨ x2),x3].
This transformation from choice between lists to choice between bundles may
seem restrictive, but nothing essential is lost. Suppose that lists are restricted to
a maximum of K alternatives. Replicate the economy with Ω states of nature to
transform each state into K identical states. This economy is equivalent to the
6To write a list with only two alternatives, complete it with repeated entries: ¯ x = (x1 ∨x2 ∨
x2 ∨ ... ∨ x2).
20original economy. But for each original state of nature there are K identical states.
So, agents can select any consumption list with a maximum of K alternatives for
each original state of nature, by selecting diﬀerent consumption bundles in the
correspondent K states of nature of the replicated economy.
With prices being equal in the K subdivisions of each state of nature, agents have
no incentive to select diﬀerent bundles in subdivisions of the same state of nature.
They are fully satisﬁed with a single bundle for each state of nature. Therefore,
selecting a bundle instead of a list is not restrictive at all. The consumption of
an agent is written as a vector that is not necessarily Pi-measurable: x ∈ IRΩl
+ or
x : Ω −→ IRl
+.
In the diﬀerential information economy, E ≡ (ei,ui,Pi,qi)n
i=1, for each agent i:
- A partition of Ω, Pi, generates its private information. Sets that belong to
Pi are denoted Ai. We also denote the set of states of nature that agent i
does not distinguish from ωj by Pi(ωj).
- Agents assign subjective probabilities to the diﬀerent events that they
observe. To each set Ak





- ui : Ω × IRl
+ → IR+ is the random utility function. For all ωj, the function
u
ωj
i = ui(ωj,·) : IRl
+ → IR+ is continuous, weakly monotone and concave.
For all xi ∈ IRl
+,ui(·,x) : Ω → IR+ is Pi-measurable.7
- ei ∈ IRΩl
+ , represents the random initial endowments. It is Pi-measurable
and strictly positive: ei(ω)  0 for all ω ∈ Ω.8
7It is equivalent to consider ui : Pi ×IRl






i ,·) : IRl
+ → IR+
is continuous, weakly monotone and concave.
8This can be replaced by
n X
i=1
ei(ω)  0 for all ω ∈ Ω, together with “irreducibility” (i.e., the
endowment of every coalition is desired).
21The ex-ante consumption bundle of agent i, denoted by xi ∈ IRΩl
+ , is not necessarily
Pi-measurable. From the perspective of the agent, consumption may be uncertain.
Evaluation of these uncertain bundles in terms of utility is based on the analysis
developed in section 5.
Agents seek to maximize their expected utility. They pessimistically evaluate












From the properties of the random utility functions, ui, it is shown below that
the expected utility function is also concave.
Ui(λxi + (1 − λ)yi) =
X
Ai∈Pi































= λUi(xi) + (1 − λ)Ui(yi).
Note that if x is Pi-measurable, then ¯ x = x and ¯ U(¯ x) = U(x). Of course that
this occurs when agents are perfectly informed. With symmetric information, the
transformed model that we present below is no diﬀerent from the classical model
of Arrow and Debreu.
The diﬀerential information economy is transformed in an Arrow-Debreu econ-
omy, EAD ≡ (ei,Ui)n
i=1, where, for each agent i:
22- The utility function, Ui : IRΩl
+ → IR+, is continuous, weakly monotone and
concave.
- The vector of initial endowments, ei ∈ IRΩl
+ , is strictly positive.
Everything is as in the model of Arrow and Debreu. With “free disposal”, the









A “price system” is a non-zero function p : Ω → IR`
+. We restrict the price



















A pair (p,x) is a competitive equilibrium of the economy with uncertain delivery
if p is a price system and x = (x1,...,xn) ∈ IRnΩl is a feasible allocation such that,
for every i, xi maximizes Ui on Bi(p,ei).
Uncertainty and asymmetric information are introduced in the model of Arrow
and Debreu by a simple transformation of the preferences. This transformation
preserves the properties of weak monotonicity and concaveness. Everything else
in the model remains unchanged. We have, therefore, existence of equilibrium
guaranteed. In fact, virtually all the results in the literature still hold: existence
of core and competitive equilibrium, core convergence, welfare theorems, etc.
237 Some Results
In our model, a property of competitive equilibrium allocations is that in states
of nature that an agent does not distinguish, the utility of the contingent bundles
is the same. This means that instead of the widely used restriction of measurable
consumption, we have a restriction of measurable utility arising naturally.
Theorem 1 Let x be a competitive equilibrium allocation.
ω0 ∈ Pi(ω) ⇒ uω
i (xi(ω)) = uω0
i (xi(ω0)).
Proof. Recall that for any ω0 ∈ Pi(ω), we have uω
i = uω0
i . Now suppose that
for some ω0 ∈ Pi(ω), we have diﬀerent utilities, that is: uω
i (xi(ω)) > uω0
i (xi(ω0)).
Then, there exists some positive δ such that uω
i (δ · xi(ω)) = uω0
i (xi(ω0)). The
modiﬁed allocation, yi, has the same utility, and belongs to the interior of the
budget set. Therefore, there exists a positive  such that the allocation (1+)·yi
belongs to the budget set and has higher utility than xi. Therefore x is not a
competitive equilibrium allocation. Contradiction!
QED
As a consequence of the fact that the utility is measurable with respect to the
information of the agents, in equilibrium, “pessimistic” expected utility is equal
to normal expected utility. For any prior probabilities over states of nature, qi(ω),


















In states that are not distinguished, agents select diﬀerent consumption bundles
to take advantage of variations in prices.
24Theorem 2 Let (x,p) be a competitive equilibrium.
ω0 ∈ Pi(ω) ⇒ p(ω) · xi(ω) ≤ p(ω) · xi(ω0).
Proof. Suppose that for some ω0 ∈ Pi(ω), we had p(ω)·xi(ω) > p(ω)·xi(ω0).
Designate by yi a modiﬁed bundle with consumption of xi(ω0) in state ω (instead
of xi(ω)). This bundle gives the same utility and allows the agent to retain some
rent. There exists a positive  such that (1 + ) · yi belongs to the budget set
and has higher utility than xi. Therefore, x is not a competitive equilibrium
allocation. Contradiction!
QED
In spite of the “pessimistic preferences”, expected utility in equilibrium is still
higher in the sense of Pareto than that which is attainable under the classical re-
striction of equal consumption in states of nature that are not distinguished (“pri-
vate core” and “Walrasian expectations equilibrium”). Eﬃciency of exchange is
enhanced in a sense that we make precise below.
Theorem 3 Let (x,p) be a Walrasian expectations equilibrium (Radner) of the
economy.
There are Pareto optima of the economy with uncertain delivery, z, such that
Ui(zi) ≥ Ui(xi) for every agent i = 1,...,n. There are examples in which the
improvement is strict (see sections 3 and 4).
Proof. Let (x,p) be a Walrasian expectations equilibrium (Radner) of the
economy. The allocation x is still feasible in the economy with uncertain delivery.
QED
In general, prices vary across states in some Ai, so theorem 4 suggests that
Walrasian expectations equilibria are not competitive equilibria of the economy
with uncertain delivery.
25Theorem 4 Let Y (ω) = {yi ⊂ IRl
+ : ui(P i(ω),yi) = ui(P i(ω),xi(ω))}.




i, then x is not a
competitive equilibrium allocation of the economy with uncertain delivery.
Proof. Assume that (x,p) is a competitive equilibrium, and that there exists




i. The modiﬁed allocation with yi
instead of xi(ω) has the same utility and is rent saving. Therefore, we can multiply
this modiﬁed allocation by (1 + ), with  > 0 and obtain an allocation in the
budget set that has higher utility. Therefore, x isn’t a competitive equilibrium
allocation. Contradiction!
QED
Cooperative solutions can also be analyzed. The core of this modiﬁed economy
may be designated as the “uncertain private core” of the economy with diﬀerential
information. It is the set of all feasible allocations which are not blocked by any
coalition. Although coalitions of agents are formed, information is not shared
between them. The transformation of the primitive preferences to pessimistic
expected utility is based only on each agent’s private information.







ei and Ui(yi) > Ui(xi) for every i ∈ S.
The “uncertain private core” is very similar to a modiﬁed private core where
measurable utility is required instead of measurable consumption. Actually, mea-
surable utility is not required, but, given an allocation in the uncertain private
core, there exists another with equal utility for every agent, having measurable
utility and requiring less resources.
Theorem 5 Let x ∈ Core(E).







Proof. If ui(ω,xi) isn’t Pi-measurable, we can multiply the xi(ω) that have
higher utilities in each element of Pi by a factor smaller than 1 to obtain a modiﬁed
allocation with measurable utility. These higher utilities were not considered in
the calculation of expected utility, because only the worst outcome is considered.





Evaluated by the (pessimistic) expected utilities, allocations in the “uncertain
private core” dominate, in the sense of Pareto, the “private core” (Yannelis,
1991) allocations. The latter are feasible in the economy for uncertain delivery,
while the converse is not true. Eﬃciency of exchange is enhanced while incentive
compatibility is preserved, independently of the beliefs regarding the preferences
of the other agents.
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